不同竞争环境下损失厌恶与网络销售效率对双渠道供应链的影响
Influence of loss aversion and online sales efficiency on dual channel supply chain in different competitive environments
摘要点击 129  全文点击 24  投稿时间:2021-02-25  修订日期:2022-01-27
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DOI编号  10.7641/CTA.2021.10166
  2022,39(4):671-681
中文关键词  竞争环境  网络销售效率  损失厌恶  双渠道供应链
英文关键词  competitive environment  network sales efficiency  loss aversion  dual channel supply chain
基金项目  国家自然科学基金项目(71561019, 71561018), 江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(GL20126), 江西省学位与研究生教育教学改革研究项目 (JXYJG–2019–167)资助.
作者单位E-mail
邱国斌 南昌航空大学 经济管理学院 futuremien@sina.com 
徐兵 南昌大学 管理学院  
中文摘要
      考虑由电商平台和制造商组成的双渠道供应链, 制造商存在网络销售效率问题, 消费者存在损失厌恶心理, 在不同竞争环境下, 分析网络销售效率、损失厌恶对企业定价和收益的影响. 结果表明, 在Nash均衡博弈、制造商主 导Stackelberg博弈和电商平台主导Stackelberg博弈下, 网络销售效率的下降导致网络销售价格和电商平台收益上 升, 制造商收益和供应链收益下降, 网络销售价格在电商平台主导Stackelberg博弈下最大, 在制造商主导Stackelberg 博弈下最小; 损失厌恶的增大导致网络销售价格、企业和供应链收益均下滑, 企业收益在自身企业主导Stackelberg 博弈下最大, 在对方企业主导Stackelberg博弈下最小; 供应链收益在供应链集中下最大, 在电商平台主导Stackelberg 博弈下最小.
英文摘要
      Considering the dual channel supply chain composed of e-commerce platform and manufacturer, the manufacturer has the problem of online sales efficiency, and the consumer has the psychology of loss aversion. Under different competitive environments, this paper analyzes the impact of online sales efficiency and loss aversion on enterprise pricing and revenue. The results show that under Nash equilibrium game, manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game and e-commerce platform dominated Stackelberg game, the decline of network sales efficiency leads to the rise of network sales price and e-commerce platform revenue, while the decline of manufacturer revenue and supply chain revenue, the network sales price is the largest under e-commerce platform dominated Stackelberg game and the smallest under manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game; the increase of loss aversion leads to the decline of online sales price, enterprise and supply chain income, the enterprise income is the largest under the Stackelberg game dominated by its own enterprise and the smallest under the Stackelberg game dominated by the other enterprise; the supply chain income is the largest under the supply chain concentration and the smallest under the Stackelberg game dominated by the e-commerce platform.