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| | Xiaoyuan Luo1,Lingjie Hou1,Xinyu Wang1,et al.[en_title][J].Control Theory and Technology,2023,21(4):515~529.[Copy] |
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| This Paper:Browse 332 Download 0 |
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| Active resilient defense control against false data injection attacks in smart grids |
| XiaoyuanLuo1,LingjieHou1,XinyuWang1,2,RuiyangGao1,ShuzhengWang2,XinpingGuan3 |
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| (1 School of Electrical Engineering, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, 066004, Hebei, China;2 School of Electrical Engineering, Jiangsu Collaborative Innovation Center for Smart Distribution Network, Nanjing, 636600, Jiangsu, China;3 School of Electronic and Electric Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China) |
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| 摘要: |
| The emerging of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can fool the traditional detection methods by injecting false data, which has brought huge risks to the security of smart grids. For this reason, a resilient active defense control scheme based on interval observer detection is proposed in this paper to protect smart grids. The proposed active defense highlights the integration of detection and defense against FDIAs in smart girds. First, a dynamic physical grid model under FDIAs is modeled, in which model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty are taken into account. Then, an interval observer-based detection method against FDIAs is proposed, where a detection criteria using interval residual is put forward. Corresponding to the detection results, the resilient defense controller is triggered to defense the FDIAs if the system states are affected by FDIAs. Linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach is applied to design the resilient controller with H_{{\infty }} performance. The system with the resilient defense controller can be robust to FDIAs and the gain of the resilient controller has a certain gain margin. Our active resilient defense approach can be built in real time and show accurate and quick respond to the injected FDIAs. The effectiveness of the proposed defense scheme is verified by the simulation results on an IEEE 30-bus grid system. |
| 关键词: Active resilient defense · Attack detection · Cyber attacks · Cyber-attack detection · Cyber grid elements · Cyber threat · False data injection attack · Smart grids security · Interval observer |
| DOI：https://doi.org/10.1007/s11768-023-00141-2 |
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| 基金项目:This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Nos. 62103357, 62203376), the Science and Technology Plan of Hebei Education Department (No. QN2021139), the Nature Science Foundation of Hebei Province (Nos. F2021203043, F2022203074) and the Open Research Fund of Jiangsu Collaborative Innovation Center for Smart Distribution Network, Nanjing Institute of Technology (No. XTCX202203). |
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| Active resilient defense control against false data injection attacks in smart grids |
| Xiaoyuan Luo1,Lingjie Hou1,Xinyu Wang1,2,Ruiyang Gao1,Shuzheng Wang2,Xinping Guan3 |
| (1 School of Electrical Engineering, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, 066004, Hebei, China;2 School of Electrical Engineering, Jiangsu Collaborative Innovation Center for Smart Distribution Network, Nanjing, 636600, Jiangsu, China;3 School of Electronic and Electric Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, China) |
| Abstract: |
| The emerging of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can fool the traditional detection methods by injecting false data, which has brought huge risks to the security of smart grids. For this reason, a resilient active defense control scheme based on interval observer detection is proposed in this paper to protect smart grids. The proposed active defense highlights the integration of detection and defense against FDIAs in smart girds. First, a dynamic physical grid model under FDIAs is modeled, in which model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty are taken into account. Then, an interval observer-based detection method against FDIAs is proposed, where a detection criteria using interval residual is put forward. Corresponding to the detection results, the resilient defense controller is triggered to defense the FDIAs if the system states are affected by FDIAs. Linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach is applied to design the resilient controller with H_{{\infty }} performance. The system with the resilient defense controller can be robust to FDIAs and the gain of the resilient controller has a certain gain margin. Our active resilient defense approach can be built in real time and show accurate and quick respond to the injected FDIAs. The effectiveness of the proposed defense scheme is verified by the simulation results on an IEEE 30-bus grid system. |
| Key words: Active resilient defense · Attack detection · Cyber attacks · Cyber-attack detection · Cyber grid elements · Cyber threat · False data injection attack · Smart grids security · Interval observer |
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