| 引用本文: | 徐春晖 ,陈珽.有多个不合作随从的诱导策略[J].控制理论与应用,1991,8(3):333~338.[点击复制] |
| Xu Chunhui, Chen Ting.Incentive Strategies with Multiple Noncooperative Followers[J].Control Theory and Technology,1991,8(3):333~338.[点击复制] |
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| 有多个不合作随从的诱导策略 |
| Incentive Strategies with Multiple Noncooperative Followers |
| 摘要点击 983 全文点击 384 投稿时间：1989-10-17 修订日期：1990-11-26 |
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| DOI编号 |
| 1991,8(3):333-338 |
| 中文关键词 Nash不合作平衡点 诱导策略 拟诱导策略 弱诱导策略 强诱导策略 |
| 英文关键词 nash noncooperative equilibrium quasi-incentive strategy weak-incentive strategy strong-incentive strategy |
| 基金项目 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 本文讨论了上级宣布策略后随从进行Nash不合作对策时的诱导问题。由于Nash不合作平衡点的不唯一性，本文提出了拟诱导策略，弱诱导策略和强诱导策略的概念。当随从目标函数是凸函数时，得到了仿射型拟诱导策略和仿射型弱诱导策略的存在条件与设计方法，当随从目标函数是正定二次函数时，得到了仿射型强诱导策略的存在条件与设计方法，并有示例说明本文的结论。 |
| 英文摘要 |
| This paper deals with incentive problems wherein multiple followers play Nash noncooperative game under the leader`s strategy. In view of the ununiqueness of Nash noncooperative equilibrium, we present the concepts of quasiincentive strategy, weak-incentive strategy, and strong-incentive strategy. We get sufficient existence conditions and design methods of quasi-incentive strategy and weak-incentive strategy when the followers` objectives are convex functions, and that of strong-incentive strategy when the followers` objectives are positive quadratic functions. Numerical examples are also given to illustrate the results of this paper. |